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DARREN STANLEY

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... concepts such as ‘individual’ and ‘society’ do not relate to two objects separately but

to two different yet inseparable aspects of the same human beings…. Both have the

character of processes, and there is not the slightest necessity, informing theories of

human beings, to abstract from this process character.

‐ Norbert Elias

Essentially, the individual is understood to be social to the core because the processes of

mind are the same as social processes.

‐ Ralph Stacey

Introduction

This paper offers as an alternative theoretical perspective to the growing collection of

commentaries on and studies of certain complex dynamical phenomena—human

knowledge and knowing—with an introduction to another complexity‐related

theoretical framework known as “complex responsive processes” (CRP). Briefly put, a

CRP perspective draws upon certain conceptual ideas from the complexity sciences as a

the characteristics of consciousness and self‐consciousness which are understood to

emerge in social processes of communicative interaction, processes of relating, and

evaluative choice (Stacey and Griffin 2005). Framed as such, a particular way of thinking

about organizational life presents itself that focuses attention on how members of an

organization might cope with uncertainty and the unknown while these same

individuals simultaneously co‐create their collective futures together on an on‐going

basis. In other words, the central concern is for how individual and collective identities

arise, how such identities are related, and how they change (Stacey 2003).

As complexity scholar and group therapist, Ralph Stacey, suggests in his book

The increasing intricacies of interdependence between people in modem life make it

more important than ever to understand processes of human relating.

Stacey suggests that many human beings with a westernized perspective have a

tendency to base an understanding of human beings (as individuals and groups) on an

abstraction that marks a fundamental distinction and separation between the individual

and the collective. As a response to this kind of prying apart of living phenomena,

Stacey and his colleagues at the Complexity and Management Centre of the University

of Hertfordshire have crafted an alternative way to understand human knowledge,

individually and collectively, co‐emerge together. That is, the individual and the

the phenomena of individual minds and social relationships.

The theoretical underpinnings behind CRP have emerged from, and fit within, a

particular historical context of a few decades of a certain collection of conceptual ideas

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and diverse theoretical frameworks pertaining to the dynamics, conditions, and forms of

various complex phenomena. In this paper, an overview of certain key conceptual ideas

from the complexity sciences in relation to CRP will be reviewed to situate CRP on the

larger theoretical landscape of complex dynamical phenomena, whereupon an outline of

Staceyʹs theory of CRP will be described. In the end, this paper examines some

implications for a CRP framework on the ways in which certain aspects of human

knowledge and knowing might relate to contexts of pedagogy: while there are many

aspects that could be examined, this paper considers the role of the teacher in terms of

“effect” as opposed to “affect”—a reflection of Stacey’s gesture‐response structure.

On the Resonance of Certain Theories of Complex Phenomena and CRP

It might be tempting to suggest that many of todayʹs complexity‐related ideas arose

during more recent times. Much of Norbert Elias’ (1991) work from the 1930s and 1940s

in, particular key ideas more recently associated with the complexity sciences, especially

the notions of “self‐organization” and “emergence.” Indeed, as Stacey (2003) points out,

Elias’ ideas appeared “well before the appearance of the new sciences of nonlinear

dynamics, which include far‐from‐equilibrium thermodynamics, mathematical chaos

theory and theories of complex adaptive systems.” The point, here, is not so much to

give a certain precedence or priority to Elias’ work and ideas, but rather to show that the

developments in the complexity sciences do, in fact, support what he was arguing for as

“the ubiquitous presence in nature of the unpredictable order in disorder through

processes of spontaneous self‐organization” (Ibid.).

Many of the concepts derived from, or associated with, the complexity sciences can

be found in a number of different domains, especially during the past couple decades.

These domains include the study of physiological subsystems (Bassingthwaighte,

Liebovitch, and West 1994), cognition (Capra 2002), organizations and the management

of organizations like the workplace (Axelrod and Cohen 1999; Guastello 1995), the social

sciences (Byrne 1998), the arts (Briggs 1992), cultural complexity (Hannerz 1992), the

development and evolution of urban and suburban centers (Jacobs 1969), and ecology

(Ball 1999). This list can be extended quite easily given that complexity thinking, suffice

to say, has more or less been used in recent times to address many different scales of

complex organizational phenomena in a transdisciplinary fashion. To be sure, the

complexity sciences are concerned with the apparently disordered and sometimes

turbulent nature of certain systems in the natural and virtual worlds. As Waldrop (1992)

points out, the science of complexity, as a study of phenomena at the edge of order and

chaos, seems to “defy all the conventional categories,” touching upon phenomena like

stock market crashes, the evolution of species and ecosystems, the collapse of countries

and economic markets, and the mind, just to name a few.

Complexity science also has made some headway into education and educational

research, albeit slowly, as evidenced by the number of important texts that are to be

found (Davis & Sumara 2006; Davis, Sumara, & Luce‐Kapler 2000; Doll 1993; Doll,

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Fleener, St. Julien, & Trueit 2005; Morrison 2002). As Davis and Sumara (2006) point out,

complexity prompts a kind of “level‐jumping between and among different layers of

organization” orienting oneʹs attention to “other dynamic, co‐implicated, and integrated

levels, including the neurological, the experiential, the contextual/material, the symbolic,

the cultural, and the ecological.” It is fitting, as such, that complexity science would have

something to say about the many aspects of teaching and learning, but even more

generally to the large complex systemic picture of education. Hailed as a “new science”

theoretical strands (like chaos theory, the theory of dissipative structures, and complex

adaptive systems), emphasizing the complexity and diversity of the field itself.

Certainly, a number of key conceptual elements (for example, nonlinearity, selforganization,

and emergence) lie at the heart of these and other theories that concern the

dynamism and dynamics of complex phenomena—products and processes.

Conceptually speaking, deterministic laws and rules are said to direct the course of

certain kinds of systemic phenomena and the patterned and patterning possibilities

thereof. In the case of chaos theory, deterministic nonlinear equations are said to drive

the phenomenon of interest where every functional or operationalized output is also an

input: recursivity or reiteration is said to drive the system onward. While long‐term

predictability may not be possible, a particular pattern can be known for a given range

of a control parameter where an “implicit order” can be found through the on‐going

iterations of the system (Stacey 2003). As the parameter changes, however, the overall

pattern of the attractor can change qualitatively at certain critical parametric values. That

is, as various textual references describe a phenomenon known as the “butterfly effect”

which suggests a “sensitivity to initial conditions,” a change in the parametric values

(and not so much the independent variables) of a system can change the overall attractor

(Kelso 1995). In any case, the overall patterns may be described as stable, unstable or

strange attractors (depending upon the parametric control value). What appears in the

end, however, is a kind of image depicted as a spatialized pattern abstracted from time

or as some rhythmic pattern when viewed as a temporal process (Stacey 2001). To be

sure, chaos theory is concerned with the overall behavioral pattern of the attractor set as

a whole where a pattern can be changed from the “outside” of the system by adjusting a

control parameter.

Furthermore, Stacey (2003) notes that chaos theory cannot be applied so simply to

human activities that are, by and large, not deterministic. Of course, some people say

that certain human behavior may appear, if only at certain times, to be quite predictable

to them as observers of human behavior, although long‐term predictability is not

possible. As a source domain of metaphors for human action, chaos theory reminds us

that unpredictability challenges many well‐established views of human cognition.

Naturally, chaos theory, which addresses phenomena that are paradoxically stable and

unstable all‐at‐once, is not the only theoretical framework to do so. In fact, Prigogine’s

theory of dissipative structures also addresses dynamical phenomena of a turbulent

nature (Prigogine and Stengers 1997; Nicolis and Prigogine 1989). Again, Stacey (2003)

DARREN STANLEY

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also objects to the simple application of Prigogine’s theory of dissipative structures,

although there is a striking resonance with Elias’ work. The theory of dissipative

structures also makes the claim that particular kinds of dynamical phenomena are,

paradoxically, simultaneously stable and unstable phenomena. As Stacey (2003) points

out, Pigogine’s ideas on “unknowable futures emerging in local interactions in the

present” are “essentially the same” as Elias’ ideas on “the transformative process of

social evolution”.

As such, Prigogine takes not the individual entity as the fundamental unit, but the

collective where variability in the actions of the individuals can prompt change in the

larger collective through the amplification of those differences. In this manner, the larger

collective self‐organizes, and the variable fluctuations in local interactions prompt the

collective to move into different patterns or symmetry breaks at points of bifurcation. In

a system of locally improvising entities, there needs to be a certain measure of diversity

in those entities and a capacity for individuals, as well as the larger organization, to

adapt across the many scales of organization in the environment. This characteristic of

local diversity in interaction resonates with Stacey’s interpretation of Elias’ work on

“social processes that form and are formed by individuals”. Under the on‐going

transformation of the whole and the parts, both the individuals and the collective whole

change through a process in time that affects the individuals and the whole in the local

interactions of the improvising parts. This phenomenon can best be thought of as

paradoxical where a “both‐and” mindset sees how the parts influence the whole and the

whole, as well, influences the evolution of the parts.

As a framework for the modeling of particular kinds of collectives, complex

adaptive systems (CAS) involve the study of (usually) large collections of agents that act

according to their own rules of local interaction. As with the phenomenon of dissipative

structures, no single entity or subset of entities in the collective can determine the

behavior of the larger whole. As Stacey (2003) rightly points out, no agent can stand

“outside” the system to direct the system as each and every agent is already a part of the

system. Given the local responsiveness of each agent in the system, the unfolding of the

systemic whole occurs without a blueprint and authority figure. Such systems have the

capacity for a diverse range of possible patterns arising from certain conditions and

principles such as redundancy, variability, local interaction, and organized randomness

(Johnson 2001).

Still, in many examples of CAS (most notably computer simulations), the agents in

the system do not adapt, although the larger “system” might. Unlike dissipative

structures, these agents tend to follow the same (small set of) rules of interaction with a

uniformity to and in their interactions. What emerges, therefore, is the result of local

interactions, rather than a diversity in the agents. That is, in systems like computer

models, the agents tend to be homogeneous in nature where their virtually‐reified

“bodies” are identical to one another. As such, the possibility for moving into other

kinds of patterns remains improbable, limiting the collective to a few already‐known or

knowable patterns.

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Of course, not all CAS function in this fashion. In some cases, the agents are not

homogeneous and, therefore, open up the possibility for new attractor sets. Like

dissipative structures, some CAS can persist in a coherent and intrinsic fashion through

a spontaneous emergence of transformation and continuity. The difficulty that Stacey

(2003) has with CAS is that it becomes too easy for one to “focus attention on the

‘system’ and lose sight of the process of interaction” . To do so, one risks reifying the

system, forgetting that while coherence may “hold” the system together, it cannot be

experienced as a cohesive whole but only as on‐going patterns of relating.

CRP as a Framework for Knowing

The notion of CRP is one that evolved during the 1990s through the on‐going efforts of

Ralph Stacey (2001, 2003) and his colleagues (Shaw 2002; Stacey and Griffin 2005). CRP,

as an intellectual framework to understand human action, emerged as a response to

particular difficulties they found from applying certain concepts drawn directly from the

underlying conceptual ideas for complex adaptive systems. Stacey’s arguments speak

out against the direct application of concepts drawn from CAS to understand human

action and life in organizations, calling for a need to incorporate into one’s

understanding of human action and organizations considerations for human

consciousness, self‐consciousness, the mind, self and society as well as power dynamics

and identity formation (Stacey and Griffin 2005).

Stacey’s need to understand human action and life in social organizations

differently stems from a view that organizational phenomena are fundamentally

“system” wherein local interacting bodies give rise to other coherent bodies at other

scales of organization. Rather, the theory of CRP is concerned with the notion of

“temporally iterated interaction” as the fundamental aspect of human reality where the

concept of a “whole” as a spatialized concept is an “imaginative construct arising in that

interaction” (Stacey and Griffin 2005). Put differently, the spatialized nature of bodies, a

fundamental feature of CAS, cannot be an aspect of certain phenomena like the mind,

society, and social organizations. The reification of such phenomena demands the

postulation of a boundary and, hence, the notions of “inside” and “outside,” which is

problematic. Thus, the notion of “embedded bodies,” a notion frequently alluded to

under a CAS‐oriented framework, is called into question—at least as far as such notions

as the mind, society, and social organizations are concerned.

Given that CRP are understood as temporal processes, one can articulate all at once

a theory of self and the social aspect of human beings since all human interactions are

simultaneously interactions with others and one’s self. Drawing upon the work of

Norbert Elias, Stacey argues that his theory of CRP offers a view of two (apparently)

different phenomena manifest through the same processes, the singular and plural

“forms” of relating with one’s self and others. Given that any interaction can only give

rise to further interactions, an interaction produces nothing—nothing above nor below,

neither inside nor out. As Stacey (2003) writes:

DARREN STANLEY

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Interaction produces only further interaction and is its own reflexive, self‐referential

cause. There is only process, no system at all. In fact there is no inside and outside. There

is no ʹinternalʹ world and there is no social system. (p. 5)

Put differently, Stacey says:

In the spatial sense interaction is a process producing a system inside and a system

outside as the “wholes” of mind and society. In the temporal sense, however, process is

not producing anything other than itself. (p. 7)

Interactions are essentially actions between human bodies—even with one’s self—where

each action gives rise to a structure of gestures and responses, a structure which is

fundamentally communicative since each gesture gives rise to a response and each

response gives rise to a gesture. Through our uniquely evolved biological structure

(especially our capacity for consciousness and self‐consciousness awareness), we have

developed a significant ability to evoke in others similar responses that we have for

ourselves. These shared responses show how as human beings we can communicate in

“significant symbols”: Through this sense of “shared” understanding, therefore, we have

the ability as individuals to act in ways that reflect our own expectations of how others

might respond.

Historically, in terms of Western thought, the distinction between the individual

and the collective has suggested that the mind is inside a person and that those things

described as social are outside a person in the form of a system. As such, individuals are

said to be “social” because “they represent the social outside in the inside of their

minds” (Stacey 2003). The mind and the social collective, however, are patterns that arise

from the activities of human bodies. Thus, paradoxically speaking, the mind shapes and

is shaped by the actions of other human beings: “Individuals,” Stacey writes, “are then

thought of as social not because of representations of social relations in their minds but

because the processes of mind are the same processes as social relating” . It is important,

however, to note that this particular stance does not diminish the experiences that we

may have of our own individuality or our social relations with others.

As an “individual,” the endless activity and chatter of my mind—the silent

conversations with myself, the songs that are sung, the images that “enter” my mind,

and private feelings that I experience—is not something “inside” of me, but rather the

self‐directed activity of my own body. As Stacey (2003) suggests, such a thought “in no

Stacey reminds us, following Elias’ arguments, this is an illusion that has evolved over

time as a result of an apparent social need to keep what we truly experience hidden from

others (Elias 1994). Of course, it may not even be possible to cease talking about the

mind and the social through spatial metaphors, i.e., container metaphors. Naturally,

there is an extensive body of literature by cognitive linguists (see Johnson 1987; Lakoff &

Johnson 1980) who have proposed that such conceptual metaphors play an important

role in our understanding of the nature of our embodied cognition. For this reason, we

may continue to express our own experiences through such metaphorical structures.

That said, it may not be appropriate to continue talking about and describe our

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experiences in ways that are problematic: to talk about our experiences in terms of

“insides” and “outsides” is still an abstraction from our immediate interactions with

others. To do so, may, in fact, suggest that we may not take our experiences seriously

enough in spite of the fact that such abstractions must be significant meaningful symbols

of interaction.

Shifting the ways in which we might think about what goes on and happens in the

classroom are bound to affect us—as teachers and students—in ways that cannot be

known in advance. In a profession that is largely understood as a body that presents

knowledge as something that is a given, known and fixed, uncertainty would seem to

hold no place. But, more importantly, and for the purposes of this paper, the remaining

sections of this paper will give some consideration to the relationships between

knowledge, knowing, and understanding within a pedagogical context.

Complex Responsive Processes:

A Radical Understanding of Teaching and Learning?

The question of “What is happening when one is ‘learning’?” suggests a myriad of other

concerns and questions. Concerned as one might be to describe a theory of cognition,

one might wonder about how the mind works, the relationship between the mind and

the brain, how learning unfolds, the status of knowledge, and the kinds of insights that

contemporary views of learning might hold for teaching (Davis, Sumara, and Luce‐

Kapler 2000). Literally, as a “way of seeing,” a theory of learning, with attending

assumptions and assertions, forms the basis for all teaching. An emphasis on how one

practice: to think otherwise plays into a “key taken‐for‐granted feature of current

Western thought” that envisions a gap between our “ways of thinking as theory from

action as practice” (Stacey 2003). Instead, as Stacey purports, “as one thinks differently

so one practices differently” (Ibid.).

Historically, the field of education bears the marks and traces of a number of

different theoretical frames that described the phenomenon called “learning.” Many of

my own experiences in school as a student would allude to a range of “complicated”

notions: learning was mechanical, machine‐like, linear, goal‐oriented, and directed

towards the need to be efficient. Of course, these descriptors are essentially those

described in the work of Davis and colleagues (2008). As many readers of this journal

will attest, these terms and images are compared and contrasted with other more

“complex” ones: thus, references to biological metaphors, feedback loops, growth, and

sufficiency‐oriented are used. The difference is quickly summed up in terms of theories

1 In “between” these two theoretical perspectives on learning, Davis et al. refer to “coherence theories” as a set of

alternatives to two correspondence theories: mentalism and behaviourism. This set of alternatives varies with the

specific attention and interest of a theorist who may focus on the individual, social collectives, various cultures, and the

environment. But, more generally, they reject various false dualisms, e.g., body/mind, self/other, individual/other,

knower/knowledge, and human/non-human.

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This paper does not deny the idea that education is a “transphenomenon,” referring to

the term as used by Davis (2005). It would be difficult to argue that a range of attentions

to different scales of phenomena is not pertinent to the project of schooling and

education. To be clear, however, it is the extent to which particular principles form the

basis for each scale of learning: these principles—e.g., diversity, redundancy, nonlinearity,

neighboring interactions, decentralized control, etc.—are addressed

throughout the larger complexity literature as well as the more specific literature on

education and complexity. Still, the overarching framework of complexity invokes a

spatialized notion of learning—learning bodies.

This paper argues for some reconsideration to be given to phenomena like the mind,

society, and organizations—one rooted in a temporalized understanding of learning as

opposed to a spatialized one. The metaphor of the “body” needs to be reconsidered. As

such, some consideration must be given to the notions of “knowledge,” “knowing,” and

“understanding” as alluded to in the title of this paper in terms of the contexts of

teachers, students and classroom settings. If learning and understanding, for instance,

are to be understood more in terms of temporalized processes as opposed to spatialized

phenomena, what thoughts or insights might arise?

First, it is important to recognize another influence on Stacey’s work which can be

“conversation of gestures.” As a social act, the “gesture‐and‐response” structure of

interaction between students or teacher‐and‐students constitutes meaning for all

involved (in some way and even for other listeners) as every gesture by one person calls

forth a gesture by another. The co‐emergent meaning lies in the relational nature of the

classroom every affect prompts an effect and so on. Where meaning does not rest within

any “part” of the gesture‐and‐response structure, i.e., “within” the individual, meaning

does arise as a result of interaction (that begets only further interaction) in a fashion that

resonates with Maturana and Varela’s (1980, 1992) concept of “structural determinism.”

As such, we might consider the classroom as a “conversation of gestures” or, as Davis

and Sumara (2006) have described, as a “structurally determined” body.

Such a structural understanding of the classroom suggests a strong historical place,

a place in the “historical present” which simultaneously re‐constructs the future. The

structure of the classroom, therefore, announces a particular sense of time that is

necessarily non‐linear to some degree given the nature of the healthiness of the

relationships. Even more, every such structure of gesture‐and‐response announces a

kind of symbol in some sense as a meaningful action. The significance of such a symbol

would suggest and calls forth the same (or a similar) effect in she who gestures towards

another. It is this self‐reflexive nature with one’s self that allows the teacher, therefore, to

“know what to do” in terms of planning, instructing, and other forms of interaction. In

other words, as Stacey (2003) writes, it is the evolution of our central nervous systems as

a biological beings that has “enabled [us] to gesture to others in a manner that [is]

capable forth in [ourselves] the same range of responses as in those to whom [we] are

gesturing” (p. 61).

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When I plan for my classes, therefore, I am engaging in a social conversation of gestures

(with myself) that I imagine happening with my own students. That is, I have the

capacity to imagine the possible consequences of my gestures. To suggest that such

actions were merely “planning” falls short of the simultaneous possibility for

transformation in the teacher and her students. To be sure, in the realm of the social,

there is also the presence of continuity as in the on‐going presence of coherent thought,

beliefs, and cultural patterns as they might be played on in the nature and structure of

the classroom—rows of desks, blackboards, curriculum guides, direct instruction and so

on. Although habits of mind and body do change in time, the social structures of the

classroom that is a conversation of gestures serves as a structure which is “shared,

repetitive and enduring” in its “values, beliefs, traditions, habits, routines and

procedures” (Stacey 2003, p. 65).

As discussed, education bears the marks and traces of a number of different theories

of learning described by Davis and his colleagues (2008) as theories of coherence and

complexity. One might, however, re‐cast such a distinction in terms of “affect” and

“effect.” The former reflects a view of learning that is apparently well‐defined, caught

up in notions of linear cause‐and‐effect relationships. The latter notion of “effect,”

however, resonates well with Stacey’s thinking on CRP. Specifically, the communicative

structure of gesture‐and‐response reflects the notion of “effect.” To be sure, CRP is

rooted in processes of self‐organization and learning, in relation to how individual and

collective identities arise, how such identities are related, and how they change, is more

appropriately thought of in terms of the communicative structure of gesture‐andresponse.

Stacey might, in fact, suggest that we are every bit alike as we are different—

we are complex beings, after all. But if one were to take one’s experiences seriously, one

would see that the individual is social through and through, arising through the same

on‐going patterns of human interaction. To use two terms used by Davis (as well as

others), we might move towards an understanding of teaching as “prompting” or

“occasioning” learning.

When I understand something, therefore, it arises from some interaction that calls

forth some meaningful symbol—even if only for myself as when I prepare for my

weekly classes at the faculty. Such a prompt calls forth the possibility of an apparent

paradox of simultaneous continuity and transformation. Knowing, therefore, cannot be a

case of “knowing that,” but possible knowledge arising in interaction. Knowledge is

never an absolute, neither fixed nor given. It is emergent possibility—the “effects” of a

gesture‐and‐response social structure of interactivity rather than mere “affects” as in a

transactional framework—arising from the social interactions of our embodied minds in

relation to ourselves and one another.

References

New York: Free Press.

University Press.

DARREN STANLEY

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Schuster.

Davis, B. 2005. Complexity and education: Some vital simultaneities. Paper read at Proceedings of the 2005

Complexity Science and Educational Research Conference, November 20‐22, 2005, at Loranger, LA.

Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

University Press.

Company.

ed. New York: Free Press.

New York: Routledge.

Routledge.

Schuster.

About the Author

Darren Stanley is Assistant Professor of Elementary Education (Mathematics) in the Faculty of

Education at the University of Windsor in Windsor, Ontario. He received his doctorate form the

University of Alberta, and his research interests include the study of complex phenomena as a

paradigm for understanding and framing aspects of health and healthy learning organizations,

including healthy schools. Additionally, he is interested in the circulation of lived phenomena with

complexity frameworks. As a teacher educator in the facultyʹs pre‐service education program, he is

interested in the ways in which pre‐service teachers enact various pedagogical stances to mathematical